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1 Introduction
Left on their own, markets typically underinvest in areas such as infrastructure, health, human capital
and R&D, activities that generate positive externalities across generations but require up-front invest-
ments. Governments routinely get involved in such areas motivated by a desire to improve upon lais-
sez faire. Such intervention, though, may create intergenerational conflict since many of the benefits
arrive in the future to generations that did not incur its cost in the present: there may emerge long-run
winners and short-term losers.1
A standard approach to checking whether a proposed policy intervention is desirable is to employ
the Kaldor-Hicks criterion and verify if the policy generates an efficiency gain – a hypothetical po-
tential for the winners to compensate the losers (and leave the latter as happy as before the policy
was initiated). If everyone post policy is at least at their pre-policy utility and there are still some re-
sources left standing, then following Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), the present value of these new, net
resources could, in principle, be distributed in some fashion to future generations; this is how the po-
tential for Pareto improvement is demonstrated. An important, recent paper that takes this approach is
Nishiyama and Smetters (2007) where a hypothetical LSRA (lump sum redistributive authority – Auer-
bach and Kotlikoff, 1987) compensates the losers from social security privatization. In their words, “the
LSRA is not being proposed as an actual government institution. Instead, it is simply a hypothetical
mechanism that allows us to measure the standard Hicksian efficiency gains in general equilibrium
associated with privatization.” They go on to write, “[C]onstructing a policy that is actually Pareto im-
proving from a policy that improves Hicksian efficiency is a tougher task.” [emphasis ours] Why is it
tougher? Because an actual policy, once implemented, would release its own dynamics and produce
general-equilibrium gains and losses spread across generations. All such gains and losses would have
to be properly accounted for if the policy is to be deemed genuinely Pareto-improving, generation by
generation. It is this “tougher task” we take on.
To that end, we study a standard overlapping-generations model of a closed economy – similar in
many aspects to the models in Azariadis and Drazen (1990) and Boldrin and Montes (2005) – with three
generations (young, middle-aged, and old), no population growth, and endogenous physical and hu-
man capital accumulation. There is no intra-generational heterogeneity, and importantly, no altruism.
Human capital accumulation is subject to a standard intergenerational externality: loosely speaking, it
is easier for agents to acquire more education if their parents are already well-educated. When young,
agents may borrow from perfect capital markets to pay for their educational expenses. When middle
aged, they pay off these loans, work, consume, and save for old age. All markets, education-loan, labor
and capital, are complete. Just to be clear, define a laissez-faire (LF) economy as the market economy,
just described, with no government presence. Assume the LF economy is in a steady state and that it is
1A popular approach to slicing through such conflict is to postulate an intergenerational social welfare function with
weights on all generations – see, for example, Blanchard and Fischer (1989; Ch. 3); an optimal policy may be constructed by
maximizing such a function. Of course, as is well-known, this requires the researcher to take a stand on the weights; also,
just because some measure of overall weighted welfare is higher doesn’t mean every generation along the way is happier.
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dynamically efficient.
In the presence of the human capital externality, education spending in the LF is too low and a
government could intervene to raise education spending levels beyond LF hoping to improve long-run
welfare.2 To fix ideas, start from the LF steady state and consider an incremental but permanent in-
crease in public education spending above its LF level.3 We work with a setting in which private and
public spending on education are perfect substitutes which means public spending crowds out private
spending one for one. As a result, all education spending becomes publicly financed, relieving the
young of the cost of private spending. To finance public education, the government sells bonds to the
current middle-aged (who, recall, were schooled under laissez faire). The resulting debt is, therefore,
productive – targeted at public education – and is to be serviced at market rates. The debt must be
serviced using taxes and, if necessary, new debt may be issued. But how much taxes can the govern-
ment impose? For us, at all points in time, the government’s ability to tax is restrained by the Pareto
criterion so as to ensure all generations, including the currently-alive ones, are at least as well off after
the intervention as before. Evidently, this sort of public education-debt-tax policy releases multiple
general-equilibrium effects downstream. Under dynamic efficiency, it is possible that debt explodes
unless enough taxes are raised to put on the brakes.4 Our question, then, becomes, is there a sequence
of minimum-required, incremental government debt (and associated lump-sum taxes) that leave all
generations as well off as under LF and ensures the path of debt is non-exploding?
What sort of welfare gains are available to be taxed? Under the policy initiated at some date t, the
current young accumulate higher levels of human capital (than they would have under LF), a possible
source of direct welfare gain to them at t + 1, during their middle age. The inaugural middle-aged,
schooled under LF, do not directly benefit from the policy; indirectly, they do. If, on impact, debt
crowds out capital – Diamond (1965) – the wage rate falls and the rate of return rises. The former
harms the middle-aged at t+ 1, the latter benefits the old, the middle-aged at t who took on the debt.
This rate-of-return effect helps bring down the opportunity cost of financing education to the middle-
aged at t. On net, there may not be enough welfare gains to tax (Pareto-constrained) and repay the
debt entirely in one generation. New debt would have to be issued to pay for past-debt service, debt
2Indeed, even in the absence of the externality, education spending in a dynamically-efficient LF is too low because
private spending has an attached opportunity cost, say R, the market interest rate on loans, while public education, inter-
mediated across generations, has a cost of 1, where R > 1 (dynamic efficiency). This point has been fleshed out in Andersen
and Bhattacharya (2017).
3The discussion in the introduction is kept somewhat loose for expositional clarity. In Section 5.3 below, we prove the
equivalence of the LF steady state with, what we call, the LF package steady state, one where policy exactly replicates the LF
steady state equilibrium. The transition studied in the paper starts when the government considers a small but permanent
increase in education spending above its LF package steady state level.
4Anytime a debt is (partly) serviced by means of another debt, the issue arises, is the debt on an explosive path? As
is well known, this issue does not arise if the gross return on bonds lies below unity (assuming zero population growth)
thereby allowing for Ponzi debt as well as bond seigniorage (Bullard and Russell, 1999), the ability of the government to
raise net revenue from the sale of bonds itself. In our setting, debt must bear the same return as capital and if we focus
on the case where the gross return on bonds exceeds unity (dynamic efficiency), then the path of debt we construct may
explode: “debt will grow so large that the government will be unable to find buyers for all of it, facing either default or a
tax increase” (Elmendorf and Mankiw, 1999).
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retirement, and current education spending; this process is repeated here on releasing indirect, general-
equilibrium gains and losses over time.5 Thankfully, the education externality gains vigor as the stock
of human capital rises and produces direct income gains downstream that may be taxed to support debt
repayment. The challenge is to keep track of all these direct and indirect gains and losses unleashed by
public education, debt and taxes – each constrained by the generation-by-generation Pareto criterion –
and ensure debt does not explode.
We prove that all competitive equilibria are summarized by a two-dimensional, first-order, non-
linear dynamical system in debt and capital. These are linearized near the LF steady state and the
dynamics of debt is studied with special focus on the possibility of debt retirement in finite time.6 The
main analytical finding is a strong, possibility result. Starting from a laissez-faire steady state, it is
possible for the government to implement an incremental debt-financed, public education scheme that
generates more human capital and higher welfare in the long run relative to laissez faire, and most im-
portantly, along the trajectory no transitional generation is harmed relative to laissez faire; additionally,
the path of debt does not explode.7 Sufficient conditions for this local result to hold are reasonable: if
the LF steady state is locally stable, the policy perturbation is incremental, and public debt increases
on policy impact, then debt levels will fall right away for any dynamically-efficient economy with a
human capital externality, even when private and public education are perfect substitutes. Our insis-
tence that debt levels go to zero over time has an important implication. Once the debt is entirely paid
off (but welfare gains from higher human capital linger) taxes may be cut relative to their levels under
the Pareto criterion, making subsequent generations strictly better off relative to LF. Put differently, we
prove the existence of a Pareto-superior debt/tax trajectory; for that, it is sufficient (not necessary) that
debt levels go to zero.
The findings clearly indicate the main argument developed in the paper does not require the pol-
icy transition to start from the LF steady state; indeed, it can start any point along the transition to
the LF steady state, anywhere private spending on education is inefficiently low. Similarly, while the
availability of lump-sum taxes make the analytics more tractable, they are not necessary for the main
intuition to proceed; after all, since there is no within-generation heterogeneity, and hence, no possi-
bility of redistribution (an issue of some significance for research in the Mirleesian tradition, such as
5Absent the education externality, intuition inspired by Ricardian equivalence may lead one to think that the swap
(more human capital for more taxes) would be one-for-one with no real effects especially if interest rates were held fixed,
as in a small open economy. This logic is faulty partly because Ricardian equivalence does not hold in our no-altruism,
overlapping-generations economy. But more importantly, the debt here is productive.
6Debt dynamics is not of much interest in an infinitely-lived agent framework because the same agent pays for and
receives benefits from the intervention. There, under standard settings, Ricardian equivalence would hold and hence all
that is needed for an intervention to be financed is that the present value of taxes (net of transfers) equals the present value
of the cost of the intervention. Any path of debt that satisfies this would do the job. The issue of integenerational conflict
due to timing differences between costs and benefits therefore cannot arise in an infinitely-lived agent framework. And it is
precisely this conflict that makes debt dynamics worthy of attention in our setup.
7In a sense, the paper proves the existence of the economic equivalent of a perpetual-motion machine: a nation borrows
from its own people to fuel a higher level of long-run prosperity and eventually retires that debt without sacrificing anyone’s
happiness – no tears – along the way.
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Hosseini and Shourideh, 2017) distorting taxes add a tax rate-change in addition to the tax base-change
already present with lump-sum taxes, not much else.
Finally, as discussed above, the analytics rely heavily on the fact that policy changes are incremental
and can therefore be studied using linearization techniques. Clearly, the incremental approach devel-
oped in the paper is limited in what it can teach us about how to design Pareto-improving transitions
to steady states that are not in a small neighborhood of the original equilibrium. Not much is known
about global properties of generic, non-linear systems which is why analytical progress with discrete
policy perturbations is stalled.8 In numerical simulations, we explore the possibility of engineering a
discrete policy move, allowing distortionary taxes on wage income, and allowing the start date for the
reform to be away from the LF steady state. To that end, we reformulate the model to allow for an
additional labor-leisure choice so as to give distorting taxes more to work with. The expanded model
economy in the LF steady state is loosely disciplined to replicate some features of the U.S. economy.
We restrict attention to an education policy package that delivers ****% higher education spending per
pupil in perpetutiy over its starting value and ***% higher utility (than its value in the LF steady state)
for every current and subsequent generation. The numerical findings help reassure us that the main
line of logic remains intact even when policy changes are not incremental, taxes are distortionary, and
policy reform starts along the transition to the LF steady state. In the model economy, the debt to GDP
ratio rises to about 1.8% on impact and then starts to fall. It takes longer for the debt levels to fall to
zero if the human capital externality is weak or the initial policy is quite ambitious.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers a quick review of the surrounding
literature. Section 3 lays out the main issues and intuition by studying a no-frills, two-period version of
our main model. The three-period model itself is laid out in Section 4, and the definition of equilibrium
and its stability properties are clarified in Section 5. The possibility of implementing an incremental
education-debt-taxes package under the Pareto-criterion is analyzed in Section 6, while Section 7 stud-
ies the debt dynamics. Section 8 presents the results from a numerical example that allows for distorting
taxes and an endogenous labor-leisure choice. Section 9 offers few concluding remarks. The appendix
contains proofs of all major results.
2 Literature review
At first glance, it may appear that our research question lacks an element of surprise; after all, it is well
understood that in the presence of generational spillovers, a planner can improve upon laissez faire,
and with access to debt and non-distorting taxes a policymaker may, in principle, exploit future tax
payers (who benefit from the inaugural investment) and compensate the original financiers (who do
not). No doubt, the potential for such winners-pay-losers, debt-tax policies to exist is clearly there – see
8We thank the Associate Editor for suggesting that our approach indicates a transition to a discretely-better steady state
may be implemented as a sequence of transitions to incrementally-better steady states.
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Hendren, 2014. What is by no means obvious is if a policy package that is actually Pareto-improving
exists, our entry point into this literature.
At this juncture, it is instructive to compare our goals to the debt-tax-equivalence/decentralization
results in the literature. It is well known that in the textbook Diamond model with two period-lived
generations – see de la Croix and Michel (2002; Ch. 4) for an excellent exposition – any feasible path of
debt, more so a Pareto-optimal one if it exists, may be decentralized by “an adequate mix of lump-sum
taxes” that can be levied on both the young and the old generations. We wish to point out that these
sorts of equivalence/decentralization results are somewhat tangential to our focus.9 Our aim is not to
demonstrate the equivalence of debt and taxes nor is it to show that if an optimal trajectory involving
debt exists, it can be decentralized via taxes – that may well be true. Our goal is to construct and
prove the very existence of a Pareto-superior debt/tax trajectory in the first place, one that improves on
laissez faire without hurting any transitional generation (indeed, making some generations better off);
our goal is not to assume the existence of such a path and demonstrate a way to decentralize it with
taxes alone.
Public debt (with accompanying taxes) is the set of instruments studied in this paper but it is one,
among many, fiscal instruments we could have studied that are available to governments for that pur-
pose. Indeed, there is a large literature – see Gale (1990) and de la Croix and Michel (2002; Ch 3,4) – that
studies equivalence between various fiscal instruments showing how a certain equilibrium trajectory
under one instrument may be exactly replicated by another. Such equivalence is not our interest here.
Our foremost concern is whether the financing instrument we study – debt – can help rationalize a
genuine welfare-improving government intervention without hurting any transitional generation.
Our use of the Pareto criterion is in line with a large literature – prominent examples include the
seminal paper by Breyer (1989), Breyer and Straub (1989), Belan et.al (1998), Pemberton (1999), Köthen-
bürger and Poutvaara (2006) – that studies, in a dynamically efficient economy, the possibility of a
Pareto-improving transition from a return-dominated, pay-as-you-go pension system to a fully funded
one. Our paper takes a first step at fleshing out the dynamics of productive debt under an intergener-
ational Pareto criterion. In fact, the worthiness of our exercise is clear from the following quote from
Ball and Mankiw (1995):
“...Thus, the winners from budget deficits are current taxpayers and future owners of capital,
while the losers are future taxpayers and future workers. Because these gains and losses
balance, a policy of running budget deficits cannot be judged by appealing to the Pareto
criterion or other notions of economic efficiency” (Ball and Mankiw, 1995, p. 108).
In a recent, influential paper, Hosseini and Shourideh (2017) consider another institution grappling
with intergenerational conflict – social security – and study the possibility of Pareto-improving reforms
9For starters, ours is not the textbook setting: debt here finances a productive activity which means it can influence the
budget sets of agents and even crowd out private spending. Also, our government scheme requires only the middle-aged
be taxed. These differences imply that the textbook decentralization result may not be automatic in our setup.
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of the same. They use a quantitative, overlapping generations economy consistent with aggregate
and distributional features of the U.S. economy. Their model allows for individuals of each cohort
to be heterogeneous in their earning ability, mortality and patience – all private information – which
allows them to study the role of reforms in reducing within-generation distortions and the balancing of
equity-efficiency concerns. Similar to us, they stress the importance of accounting for the downstream,
general-equilibrium effects of such reforms. Like us and Werning (2007), the seminal paper in this area,
they eschew the use of a social welfare function. They find that, when lump sum taxes are not available
(say, due to the unobserved heterogeneity), the existence of Pareto-improving policy reforms in their
environment is not routine; but, as they show, sufficient conditions do exist.
Greulich, Laczo and Marcet (2016) study Pareto-improving tax reforms to distorting labor and capi-
tal taxes in a Ramsey model with agents who are heterogeneous in their labor productivity and wealth.
By insisting that the planner not be allowed to drive consumption below some minimum, they find that
even though the long-run tax rate on capital should be zero, Pareto-improving reforms must set labor
taxes initially low and capital taxes should remain high “for a very long time”. This sort of “gradual-
ism” is important for achieving Pareto improvement. The latter result is reminiscent of our result about
the path of debt hitting zero in finite time and its importance for generating Pareto improvements.
The broader literature on debt and deficits is voluminous – Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999), though
dated, is a good survey for our purposes. Much of the literature starting from Diamond (1965) stud-
ies unproductive government debt, and is hence, not directly relevant to this paper. O’Connell and
Zeldes (1988) study environments with unproductive debt in which the sale of new debt finances all
of the interest payments on outstanding debt as well as some transfers to the young. In that world,
the government can cut current taxes without ever raising future taxes to finance the increased interest
payments. Ball et. al (1998) study whether such a Ponzi scheme can ever lead to Pareto improvements,
especially in stochastic environments. Dynamic inefficiency is key to these results. Bullard and Russell
(1999) and Chalk (2000) study issues relating to sustainability of permanent bond-financed deficits in
reasonably-calibrated, dynamically-inefficient OG models. There is a line of work – Turnovsky (1997),
Greiner and Semmler (2000), Yakita (2008) – that studies the financing of public capital via debt finance.
Greiner (2008) studies a continuous-time, infinitely-lived agent economy wherein the government aids
human capital formation by financing public education via debt finance. Under a fiscal rule ensu-
ing a sustainable path of public debt, he studies the growth effects and associated dynamics of public
debt. Given his model environment, implementation problems of the kind we encounter are not his
concern.10
10There is also a large body of work – see Cooley and Soares (1999) or more recently, Kass (2003), Kaganovich and Zilcha
(2012), Bishnu and Wang (2017), and many others – in the political-economy domain, somewhat tangential to our focus, that
studies public education policies, absent debt. In a sense, our use of the Pareto criterion establishes the set of policies that
are unlikely to face opposition as they negotiate their way through standard democratic processes. It bears emphasis that
these papers do not focus on the implementation hurdles and do not impose the Pareto criterion generation by generation.
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3 Simplified exposition and intuition
To set the scene for what is to come, we start by expositing a simpler, no-frills version of the model
economy we study further below. This will help fix ideas and intuition. Consider an overlapping-
generations economy wherein at each date t = 1, 2, ..,∞, a continuum of unit mass of identical two
period-lived agents is born. When young, agents get some income ωt, consume, and save for old age.
When old, they consume and die. Saving in young age earns a gross return of Rt+1 between t and
t+ 1. For the present, we are agnostic as to how ω and R are determined. The generation born in t has
consumption cy,t as young in t, and co,t+1 as old in t+ 1. All generations have standard preferences rep-
resentable by the utility function Ut
 
cy,t, co,t+1
  u(cy,t) + βu(co,t+1), β 2 (0, 1). The lifetime budget
constraint of an agent is cy,t+
co,t+1
Rt+1
= ωt+ yt,where yj is some to-be-determined income taken as given
by the agent. The corresponding expenditure function is given by
E(ωt, Rt+1, Ut) = mincy,t,co,t+1

cy,t +
co,t+1
Rt+1
  (ωt + yt) j U
 
cy,t, co,t+1
  Ut
Consider an equilibrium trajectory in the absence of policy – call it laissez-faire, LF – with associated
factor prices

ωLFt , R
LF
t+1
	∞
t=0 delivering utility

ULFt
	∞
t=0. Then, by definition
E

ωLFt , R
LF
t+1, U
LF
t

= 0
i.e., the exogenous income which would deliver utility ULFt at factor prices ω
LF
t and R
LF
t+1 is 0. At these
equilibrium prices, agents attain lifetime utility ULFt .
3.1 Intertemporal Pareto criterion
Next, consider a public intervention at time t (fix the time index at tˆ and start the j index) which will
generate an equilibrium trajectory (over j  0) with factor prices ωˆ j, Rˆj+1	∞j=0 and associated utility
Uj
	∞
j=0. For now, we remain agnostic as to the nature of the intervention or why it is needed as long
as it can satisfy the intertemporal Pareto criterion,
Uj  ULFtˆ for j  0,
in which case the public intervention will leave everyone at least as well off as before the policy inaugu-
ration. To go further, let us take a stand on both the cost of the intervention and its financing. Suppose
the intervention requires the government to spend

Gj
	∞
j=0. Define Tj as a lump-sum tax/transfer.
Imposing the constraint Uj  ULFtˆ for j  0 implies that the path Tj () has to satisfy
Tj ()  E

ωˆ j, Rˆj+1, ULFtˆ

=
(
> 0, a tax
< 0, a subsidy/compensation
8j  0
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where ωˆ j, Rˆj+1 are the equilibrium prices under the path Tj (): cohorts along the “intervention trajec-
tory” that generate the same (or higher) utility compared to the LF. It is noteworthy that Tj () captures
the maximum taxation capacity alluded to in the introduction. This is the compensating variation. Of
course, the entire

Gj, Tj
	∞
j=0 package needs to satisfy the intertemporal budget constraint of the gov-
ernment. This raises the question, can the government raise enough taxes (Tj () , under the Pareto
restriction) to cover its expenses

Gj
	∞
j=0, especially under dynamic efficiency, Rˆj > 1.
3.2 Kaldor-Hicks
For that, we would need to verify if the NPV criterion
(1)
∞
∑
j=0
 
1
Rˆj
!j h
Tj

ωˆ j, Rˆj+1, ULFtˆ

  Gj
i
 0
holds. A constraint like (1) may, on first glance, look like the standard Kaldor-Hicks criterion but it
is not. The latter would compute the hypothetical potential for winners under the intervention to
compensate the losers, i.e., it would calculate the present value of hypothetical compensating variations
(taxes and transfers) required to leave all current and future cohorts as happy as before the policy was
introduced – hypothetical, because it would ignore the general-equilibrium effects arising from actual
implementation of said taxes and transfers. The point is that the standard Kaldor-Hicks criterion checks
(2)
∞
∑
j=0
 
1
Rhj
!j h
T hj

ωhj , R
h
j+1, U
LF
tˆ

  Gj
i
 0
(not (1)) where ωhj and R
h
j+1 are hypothetical wages and interest rates igoring the fact that equilibrium
prices are themselves affected by the compensating taxes and transfers the NPV criterion proposes.
This is precisely what Nishiyama and Smetters (2007) do when they consider a hypothetical LSRA
(lump sum redistributive authority – Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1987). 11
The challenge, of course, is that, with endogenous
 
ωˆ j, Rˆj+1

, condition (1) is daunting, if not im-
possible, to verify. This is the entry point of our paper. We deliver an alternative, intuitive way to check
whether implementation of a

Gj, Tj
	∞
j=0 package is feasible without needing to verify (1).
3.3 Role of debt
To begin with, there is no requirement Tj must equal Gj at every date – the government’s budget need
not be balanced per by period. In that case, it is possible Tj < Gj holds for some j and the government
11Of course, it is by no means obvious if a policy that satisfies (2) necessarily satisfies (1) or not.
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would have to issue debt, Bj, and service it at the market interest rate Rˆj+1. It follows
Bj = Gj   Tj + RˆjBj 1
() Bj   Bj 1 =

Gj   Gj 1
  Tj   Tj 1+ RˆjBj 1   Rˆj 1Bj 2
Again, to fix ideas, for now hold Rˆj+1 = Rˆ > 18j and Gj = G 8j. Then
Bj   Bj 1 =
Rˆ

Bj 1   Bj 2
| {z }
debt service
 
Tj   Tj 1| {z }
taxation capacity
If the up-front cost at j = 0, Gt, exceeds Tt, an initial deficit, there will be some initial debt of amount
Bt = Gt   Tt > 0. Debt dynamics (dynamics in B) is thus driven by two forces i) the cost of debt
service: since Rˆ > 1, this part tends to grow/explode (the Ponzi part),12 ii) changes in the government’s
taxation capacity,
Tj   Tj 1 , which is to be constrained by the Pareto criterion. Consider the plausible
case where Tj  Tj 1 i.e., the welfare gains from the intervention build up over time allowing taxation
capacity to ramp up. If we had a handle on the growth of taxation capacity,
Tj   Tj 1 , we could
check whether it was growing fast enough relative to debt service costs (which is growing at rate, Rˆ) so
that the debt level, Bj, would not explode. Unfortunately, questions about the growth rate of taxation
capacity under the Pareto criterion are as daunting as checking whether (1) is satisfied. Our tack is
to, instead, seek a turning point, k, in the path of debt such that Bt+k   Bt+k 1 < 0. If such a point
exists, then a tail wind will emerge — debt is falling, the cost of debt service is declining, and since T
is growing, debt will fall even further.13
Having exposited the underlying intuition, we lay out a quick road map of where the paper is
headed. First, we study a model in which the presence of an intergenerational externality – a textbook
human capital externality – makes it desirable for the government to intervene. We show, under cer-
tain conditions, an incremental policy move beyond the steady state LF regime is possible under the
intertemporal Pareto criterion (using lump-sum taxes and debt) in a dynamically efficient economy.
Also, the associated path of debt does not explode. This is a strong possibility result, but it is a “local”
result – it does not indicate how “ambitious” the policy can be. Since the analytical challenges associ-
ated with the latter issue are insurmountable, we go on to present numerical illustrations showing that
the general tenor of our results holds i) if distortionary taxes are used, ii) if the policy is implemented
starting outside of LF steady-state, and iii) non-incremental policy moves are undertaken.
12This issue of debt explosion does not arise in models that specify a debt policy rule, such as the Maastricht criterion –
see Ghosh and Mourmouras (2004) and Futagami et. al (2008) – that forces the government to keep the amount of debt in
check.
13After some point in time, debt levels may converge to a positive level or they may become negative. Here on, taxes may
be reduced since the path has passed a feasibility test, no cohorts are worse off, and public debt can be eliminated leaving
future cohorts strictly better off.
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4 An overlapping-generations model with a human capital external-
ity
4.1 Primitives
We start by describing the market economy in the absence of any government presence. Consider a
closed economy, in the tradition of Diamond (1965), wherein, at each date t = 1, 2, ..,∞, a continuum
of identical three period-lived agents is born.14 There is no population growth and the size of a cohort
of newborns at any date is held fixed at 1. When young, agents can access perfect capital markets to
secure education loans (L). When middle aged, they pay off these loans, work in competitive labor
markets at a wage ω, consume, and save (S) for old age. When old, they are retired: they consume
whatever they have and die. Saving in middle-age is in the form of education loans to the young and
physical capital.
The generation born in t   1 has consumption cm,t as middle-aged in t, and co,t+1 as old in t + 1.
All generations have preferences representable by the utility function U(cm,t) + βU(co,t+1), β 2 (0, 1]
where U is twice-continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave in its arguments and
the standard Inada conditions are assumed to hold.
Output is produced using a constant-returns-to-scale, production function F(Kt, Ht) where Kt de-
notes the physical capital input and Ht denotes the human capital input at t. Let kt  Kt/Ht denote the
physical to human capital ratio – called ‘capital ratio’ for short – at date t and f (kt)  F(Kt/Ht, 1). We
assume f (0) = 0, fk > 0 > fkk, and the usual Inada conditions hold (note, hereafter, function subscripts
denote derivatives, such as fk  ∂ f ()∂k ). The final output can either be consumed in the period it is
produced, or stored to yield physical capital the following period. Without loss of generality, assume
physical capital depreciates 100% between periods.
Human capital in period t depends on educational spending (Et 1) in period t  1, and the human
capital of the previous generation:
(3) Ht = h(Et 1, Ht 1),
The h-function is assumed to have the following standard properties:
Assumption 1
h(0, 0) > 0;
∂Ht
∂Et 1
> 0,
∂2Ht
∂E2t 1
< 0,
∂Ht
∂Ht 1
2 (0, 1) , ∂
2Ht
∂H2t 1
< 0,
∂Ht
∂Et 1∂Ht 1
 0.
If hH = 0, no education externality is present. If hH > 0, an intergenerational human capital exter-
nality is present; current educational spending increases the human capital of the next and all future
14Below, in Section 6, we introduce policy action at t = ∞, the steady state of this economy; there on, the time index is j
and j = 0, 1, 2, ...,∞. The policy is initiated at j = 0.
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generations. It will be clear below that hH 2 (0, 1) is a necessary condition for ensuring the h function is
strictly concave which, in turn, rules out the possibility of perpetual endogenous growth. In the absence
of policy, all spending on education is private, and hence, E = L.
4.2 Decision rules
The constraints faced by an agent are
lifetime: cm,t +
co,t+1
Rt+1
= ωtHt   RtLt 1,(4)
middle-age: cm,t = ωtHt   RtLt 1   St,(5)
old-age: co,t+1 = Rt+1St.(6)
where ωt is the wage rate at date t and Rt+1 is the market return on saving between t and t+ 1.15
The decision problem for the representative agent at any date is: choose education spending and
saving by solving
max
St>0, 0Lt 1<ωt HtRt
U (ωt h (Et 1, Ht 1)  RtLt 1   St) + βU(Rt+1St)
subject to (5)-(6) and the usual non-negativity constraints on consumption, taking all prices and gov-
ernment policy variables as given. Taking Ht 1 as given, the first order condition characterizing private
education choice is
(7)
(
ωt hEt 1(Et 1, Ht 1) = Rt if Et 1 > 0
ωt hEt 1(Et 1, Ht 1) < Rt if Et 1 = 0
,
and it is easily verified that the second order condition is fulfilled, since ωhEE() < 0. Of course, since
private agents take the human capital externality as given and do not internalize the effect of their own
choices on the stock of human capital available to future generations, they underinvest in education
relative to what a planner would. To foreshadow, a government that internalizes this externality could
improve matters by raising E beyond what is privately optimal – see also Andersen and Bhattacharya
(2017).
The first order condition characterizing the savings decision is
(8) Ucm,t () = βRt+1Uco,t+1();
again, the second order condition is fulfilled, since Ucmcm () + R2Ucoco() < 0. Eq. (8) defines an implicit
15Usual non-negativity conditions on consumption apply. There is also a borrowing constraint: 0  Lt 1  ωt HtRt which
does not bind under the assumed Inada conditions on utility.
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savings function St = S (Yt, Rt+1) where Yt  ωtHt   RtLt 1. The response of saving to the rate of
return is important; we note
(9) SR  ∂St
∂Rt+1
=  Ucoco()βRt+1St + βUco()
Ucmcm () + βR2t+1Ucoco()
.
We restrict attention to utility functions that satisfy the following assumption
Assumption 2
(10) Uco() +Ucoco()Rt+1St  0.
This implies the substitution effect of an interest rate change dominates the income effect which, in
turn, implies ∂St∂Rt+1 > 0, the standard case considered in the literature. For later reference, note
(11) SY  ∂St∂Yt =
Ucmcm ()
Ucmcm () + βR2t+1Ucoco()
2 (0, 1)
i.e., an increase in period t income induces the middle-aged to increase saving.
5 Equilibrium
5.1 Laissez faire equilibrium
Physical capital accumulation is described by Kt+1 = St   Lt. Then, the capital-ratio is defined by
(12) kt+1  Kt+1Ht+1 =
St   Lt
Ht+1
.
Factor prices are determined by standard factor-pricing relationships:
(13) Rt  R (kt) = fk(kt), ωt  ω (kt) = f (kt)  fk(kt) kt.
Also note Rk(k) < 0 and ωk (k) =  kRk () > 0 implying a higher capital-ratio reduces the return on
capital and raises the wage rate. These return effects will be important in the discussion below.
A competitive equilibrium is defined as sequences for capital and human capital with savings deter-
mined from (8) and private education from (7) and human capital from (3) and factor prices determined
from (13). Consumptions follow from (5) and (6).
A particularly important competitive equilibrium, the laissez faire (LF) is one with no public inter-
vention. Private education in LF is described by ωLFt hE
 
ELFt 1, H
LF
t 1

= RLFt . Private saving in LF is
described by SLFt = S
 
YLFt , R
LF
t+1

where YLFt  ωLFt h
 
ELFt 1, H
LF
t 1
  RLFt LLFt 1 and SLFt = KLFt+1 + LLFt .
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Note ∂Ht∂Ht 1 2 (0, 1) and
∂2Ht
∂H2t 1
< 0 (Assumption 1) guarantee concavity of h(., Ht 1) which, along
with h(0, 0) > 0, ensures the existence of an unique steady state H for given E – call it H (E) where
H (E)  h(E, H). It follows from Assumption 1 that ∂H(E)∂E  hE(E,H)1 hH(E,H) > 0; further, assume
∂2H(E)
∂E2 < 0.
A LF steady-state is a time-invariant LF competitive equilibrium with ELF = LLF. Let ωLF 
ω
 
kLF

, RLF  R  kLF and HLF  H  ELF denote the wage rate, the interest rate and the human
capital associated with a LF steady state. Such a steady state is characterized by
(14) kLF =
S
 
ω
 
kLF

H
 
ELF
  R  kLF LLF, R  kLF  LLF
H (ELF)
where ELF is described by
(15) ω

kLF

hE(ELF, H

ELF

) = R

kLF

.
and
(16) H

ELF

= h(ELF, HLF).
Formally, a LF steady state is a 3-tuple fixed point
 
kLF, LLF, HLF

to equations (14)-(16); recall, in equi-
librium, ELF = LLF. We assume the existence and uniqueness of such a fixed point.16
For future reference, using (19), the lifetime utility associated with the LF steady state is VLF 
V
 
ωLFHLF   RLFLLF, RLF. A policy is said to satisfy the intergenerational Pareto criterion if indirect
utility under the policy delivers at least as much utility as VLF.
5.2 Laissez faire package equilibrium
We move on to descrive government intervention in this economy. Our goal is to describe a policy
package that will exactly replicate the LF steady state, hence ensuring every generation living under
the policy has utility, VLF. The policy transition we will study will be a perturbation around the policy
package steady state.
The government offers public education, Gt  0, to the young (as a possible top-up on their own
education spending, Lt). Following Buiter and Kletzer (1995) and many others, the two types of edu-
cational inputs, private and public, are assumed to be perfect substitutes in (3): Et 1  Lt 1 + Gt 1.17
Note, when Lt 1 > 0, increases in public education crowds out private education one-for-one, i.e.,
(17)
∂Lt 1
∂Gt 1
=  1 for Lt 1 > 0.
16Our description of the laissez faire economy is virtually identical to those described in Del Rey and Lopez-Garcia (2013)
and Bishnu (2013). Their arguments for existence and uniqueness of a steady state, suitably modified, also apply here.
17Since G and L are both educational inputs, they can, in general, be complements or substitutes. It is hardly a challenge
to argue for public spending if it acts as a complement to private spending.
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It follows, there exists a path of Gt, high enough, such that private education expenses are optimally
driven to the zero corner. In the subsequent analysis, starting Section 5.3, Et = G ) Lt = 0 8t.18
We posit public education is financed by selling riskless, one-period government bonds (B) at mar-
ket rates: the gross return on bonds between t and t + 1 is Rt+1, the same as the return to physical
capital (or saving, in general). The government is not allowed to save. The government also imposes a
lump-sum tax (Tt) on the middle-aged but not on the old. Let Bt be the number of one-period bonds
issued at the start of period t. Then, the government budget constraint evolves as
(18) Bt = RtBt 1 + G  Tt
where RtBt 1 is the interest cost on past debt, (Bt 1). Taxes on the middle-aged (Tt) as well as the
sale of new debt (also to the middle-aged) finances the cost of debt service to their parents’ generation
and public education for their childrens’. Below, the path of taxes Tt will be constrained by the Pareto
criterion.19
For future use, the indirect utility for a generation-t agent under the government’s package is given
by
(19) V(Yt, Rt+1) 
8<:
arg max
cm,t,co,t+1
[U (cm,t) + βU (co,t+1)]
s.t. cm,t +
co,t+1
Rt+1
= Yt
.
where Yt is defined as Yt  ωtHt   Tt   RtLt 1, St = [Kt+1 + Bt], cm,t = ωtHt   RtLt 1   Tt   St, and
co,t+1 = Rt+1St. Since VR() = Ucm,t co,t+1R2t+1 > 0 and VY() = Ucm,t > 0, indirect utility is increasing in
life-time income, Yt, and the rate of return, Rt+1.20
5.3 Replicating the LF steady state with the LF package steady state
In a LF steady state equilibrium, public education, taxes and debt are absent (Gt = Tt = Bt = 0),
and private education is at LLF. We now replicate this equilibrium with one that has government
intervention – call the latter, a LF package equilibrium.
In a LF package equilibrium, henceforth denoted with a “*”, noting private and public spending
18In effect, this removes education loans from the economy. In Wigger (2005), public debt crowds out physical capital and
reduces future wage rates (and raises interest rates) and thereby, may reduce the private incentive to invest in human capital.
In a sense, we go to the extreme by eliminating any incentive for private education spending.
19Unlike Diamond (1965) or Chalk (2000), here, as in Greiner (2008), government expenditure is productive in the sense it
contributes to human capital formation. Also, unlike much of the literature studying debt dynamics – see Chalk (2000) – the
government has no target level of debt-to-GDP ratio in mind. If debt is unproductive, then as discussed in Diamond (1965),
under dynamic efficiency, debt benefits only the current generation and hurts all future generations. The fact that debt is
productive in our setting is, hence, crucial for satisfying the intergenerational Pareto criterion.
20If the tax, instead, was distortionary, say a fraction τt of income, ωtHt, then via (7) and (8) it is clear that both the
education spending decision – hence, the tax base – and the saving decision would be distorted. Presumably, under standard
preferences, a higher tax on labor income would depress education spending via the substitution effect, and reduce saving
via the income effect. This analytical tougher case will be studied in the numerical section below.
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on education are perfect substitutes, there exists a level of public spending (G) that drives private
spending to zero yet total spending on education remains at its LF level, LLF, i.e., G = ELF = LLF. In
a steady state, in any period, the government floats debt B = LLF and uses it to finance education
G = LLF. This debt is held by the middle-aged. In the following period, the government pays RLFLLF
as interest payment on that debt to the then old by taxing the then middle-aged an amount equal to
RLFLLF (the same amount they would have paid under private loan servicing in the LF world). This
leaves everyone at the same utility level as in the LF steady state, except the government has perfectly
swapped private spending, LLF, with public spending G, and private loan repayment
 
RLFLLF

with
a lump-sum tax, T  = RLFLLF. Except for the reclassification of bonds, from private loans to public
bonds, everything is the same. Henceforth, call the steady state that replicates the LF steady state,
G = LLF, B = LLF and T  = RLLF, the ‘LF package steady state or LFPSS for short. Specifically,
middle-age LF steady state: cm = ωLFHLF   RLFLLF   [KLF + LLF],
old-age LF steady state: co = RLF

KLF + LLF

lifetime: cm +
co
RLF
= ωLFHLF   RLFLLF
middle-age LFPSS: cm = ωH   [K + B]  T ,
old-age LFPSS: co = R[K + B]
lifetime: cm +
co
R
= ωH   T 
where SLF  [KLF + LLF] = S  [K + B] , KLF = K, LLF = B, and T  = RG = RLFLLF. The
lemma below formalizes this idea.21
Lemma 1 The LF steady state with private education level, LLF, and return, RLF, is equivalent to a LF package
steady state with zero private education spending (L = 0) and publicly-funded education G = LLF, debt B = G
and a tax T  = RG levied on the middle-aged such that
(20) V  V (ωH   T , R) = VLF  V

ωLFHLF   RLFLLF, RLF

.
The proof follows by noting that under the policy, the budget set of agents and all relative prices
are unchanged, and hence all decisions and the equilibrium allocation is the same. Note, this result
is stated for a steady state equilibrium. It does not hold outside of steady state because debt crowds
out capital at the initial date causing the interest rate to change. Specifically, at the initial date, cm,t =
ωt Ht   Rt Lt 1   St, St = Kt+1 + Bt, co,t+1 = Rt+1Kt+1 + Rt+1Bt 6= Rt+1St. This issue will feature
prominently below. Importantly, for us, factor prices in the LFPSS are the same as they are in the LF
21This lemma is, at its heart, a variant of the equivalence between debt and lump-sum taxes shown in de la Croix and
Michel (2002; Ch. 4).
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steady state; moreover, lifetime utility across the two are identical.
Assumption 3 Rk () [SR ()  SY () S] 1H < 1
For future use, the following lemma provides a condition under which the LF package steady-state
is locally stable.
Lemma 2 The LFPSS is locally stable provided Assumption 3 holds.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Thus far, we have set up our version of a standard Diamond (1965) economy augmented to include
a human capital accumulation process subject to an intergenerational externality. This is the laissez
faire economy, a world with complete markets. Therein, private spending on education is too low. We
replicated that economy, in steady state, with one involving government intervention where education
spending is inefficiently low at L – see eq. (7) – even though it is fully nationalized but still delivers
V; the expenditure is paid for by debt and taxes. It is apparent that a marginal increase in government
spending over L can improve long-run welfare. But can it be done in a Pareto-improving manner?
In Section 6 below, the idea is for the government to intervene in the LFPSS – this is where the time
index t ends and is replaced by j. At j = 0, the government ushers in a permanent level of public
education spending, call it Gn, where Gn > L and continues to fully crowd out private education
spending for all j thereafter.22 The question is, can Gn be implemented so that no transitional generation
will have welfare less than V?
6 Introducing debt-financed, public education under the Pareto cri-
terion
We start with the LFPSS characterized by government policy, G = L, B = G and T  = RG. At j = 0,
a new level of G – call it Gn – is introduced where Gn = L + eG, and eG > 0 is a “small” increase over
L. (Hereon, the subscript n is added to emphasize the “new” government program). Assume the new
program is entirely unanticipated which means, at j = 0, all state variables are at their LFPSS levels.
We ask whether Gn can be implemented under the Pareto criterion. The exact steps of the argument,
here on, are as follows:
1. suppose the economy is at LFPSS with government spending, G = L, and associated indirect
utility, V
2. at j = 0, increase government expenses to Gn permanently (for all j  0) where Gn = L + eG
22What if the government intervenes at some point along the transition to the LF equilibrium, a point associated with
inefficient private spending? Lemma 1 is no longer useful in that case. We take this issue up in numerical examples below.
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3. find the sequence of minimum-required lump-sum taxes
Tn,j	∞j=0 that leave all generations as
well off as V
4. show that the associated path of government debt, Bn,j, does not explode.
It is instructive to lay bare the action in the first two periods after the policy initiation. To that end,
notice, for the inaugural middle-aged at j = 0, Et 1 = L = G and H0 = H (their human capital
is at its LFPSS level). At j = 0, the government’s expense on education becomes Gn > G. The direct
beneficiaries of this extra spending are the young at j = 0; since E = Gn > G, these initial young will
see income gains at j = 1 via hE. But, as yet, the externality has not kicked in – their parents’ human
capital is still at H and so the human capital of the middle-aged at date j = 1 (those young at j = 0) is
Hn,1 = h(Gn, H0) = h(Gn, H) > h(L, H).
What of the initial middle-aged? These agents, schooled under LFPSS, do not see any direct benefit
from the government’s new program at j = 0. They hold debt of amount Bn,0 = Gn, more debt com-
pared to B. This crowds out their capital holdings, causing R to increase (from R to Rn,1) where Rn,1
is the gross real return on bonds between j = 0 and j = 1. (This is formally show in Section 6.2 below.)
Specifically, under the new policy, consumptions are given by
middle-age at j = 0: cm,0 = ωH   Tn,0  
264Kn,1 + Bn,0|{z}
B+ eG
375 ,
old-age at j = 1: co,1 = Rn,1 [Kn,1 + B] + Rn,1 eG
cm,0 +
co,1
Rn,1
= ωH   Tn,0.
Had life under the LFPSS continued, the consumptions would have been defined as in Section 5.3:
middle-age at j = 0: cm,0 = ωH   T    [K + B] ,
old-age at j = 1: co,1 = R [K + B]
cm,0 +
co,1
R
= ωH   T 
Suppose, for an instant, S does not respond to R and R does not respond to capital, as in, say, a small
open economy. Since Bn,0 > B =) Kn,1 < K with one-for-one crowding out, it is clear the new policy
would leave the inaugural middle-aged at utility V. More generally, though, when SR (R) and Rk(k)
are not equal to zero, the extra debt, eG, will partially crowd out capital (Kn,1 < K) which will change
R from R to Rn,1 and S from K + B to Kn,1 + Bn,0. On net, it is not clear if the inaugural middle-aged
at j = 0 are better off relative to V or not. Below, we will show they indeed are. This means the welfare
gain accruable to the inaugural middle-aged at j = 0 may be taxed away (by changing Tn,0 relative to
T ) so as to leave them at V, and hence, indifferent to the new policy. If the tax on them is enough to
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retire the extra debt completely, the story ends within a generation. Otherwise, as we study in Section
6.2, new debt would have to be issued and held by the middle-aged at j = 1, and intergenerational
debt dynamics would be unleashed for j > 1. Every generation j > 1 benefits (relative to life in the
LFPSS) directly from the new program and also indirectly, via the intergenerational externality, from
having more educated parents. (As before, indirect, general-equilibrium gains from changes in the rate
of return may also arise.) Some of these benefits can be taxed away
 Tn,j to help bring down the debt
yet leave no generation with welfare less than V – the Pareto criterion. The big question is, can this be
done? Is it consistent with the debt not exploding?
6.1 Path of taxes, debt and capital-ratio
We exploit the equivalence in eq. (20) – in Lemma 1 – which equates the utility level in the LF steady
state with that achieved under the LFPSS. Note that ωn,0 = ω since the capital-ratio at start of j = 0 is
predetermined at its LFPSS value. The entire path of taxes
Tn,j	∞j=0 is thus determined by the Pareto
“equal payoff” conditions
V
0@ωn,0 h (G, Ht 1)| {z }
H
 Tn,0, Rn,1
1A = V
0@ω h (G, Ht 1)| {z }
H
 Tn,0, Rn,1
1A = V for j = 0
V
0B@ωn,1 h (Gn, H)| {z }
Hn.1
 Tn,1, Rn,2
1CA = V for j = 1
V
0BB@ωn,j h  Gn, Hj 1| {z }
Hn,j
 Tn,j, Rn,j+1
1CCA = V for j > 1
which, for compactness sake, is written as
V (ωH   Tn,0, Rn,1) = V for j = 0(21)
V
 
ωn,j h
 
Gn, Hn,j 1
  Tn,j, Rn,j+1 = V for j > 0,(22)
where the condition (21) on Tn,0 gives the initial condition for the tax on the inaugural middle-aged, and
(22) gives the dynamic path for future taxes, Tn,j, that must satisfy the Pareto-criterion for all subsequent
generations. Along with (18), (3), (13) and (12), eqns. (21)-(22) describe the entire joint dynamics of taxes
and debt in this economy. The resulting system of difference equations is multidimensional, non-linear,
and analytically daunting in general.
Define a variable
eXn,j  Xn,j   X
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as the deviation in X under the government’s “new” program relative to its value in the LFPSS, X. In
general, an “e” indicates variables are measured in deviations from the LFPSS. By taking a first-order
Taylor-approximation of the dynamical system – eqs. (21)-(22) – around the LFPSS, we get
V (ωH   Tn,o, Rn,1) ' V  VY() eTn,0 +VR()eRn,1.
Define
(23) φj  φ
 
Yj, Rj+1
  VR(Yj, Rj+1)
VY(Yj, Rj+1)
=
co,n,j+1
R2n,j+1
> 0.
Using (6), we have
(24) φj =
Sn,j
Rn,j+1
.
Also φ  SR . We can analytically show (see Appendix B)
eTn,0 = φ eRn,1 for j = 0(25) eTn,j = H eω j +ω eHn,j + φ eRn,j+1 ? 0 for j > 0(26)
Recall, eTn,j  Tn,j   T  refers to the deviation in taxes (or subsidies) under the government’s “new”
program relative to its value in the LFPSS, T . If the policy on impact causes the return, R, to increase
(eq. 25), then the inaugural middle-aged (as savers) are made better-off, and the equal pay-off condition
implies they can be taxed an amount equal to the value of the change in the return. For subsequent
periods, the tax deviation to be paid under the Pareto-criterion, eTn,j, reflects the direct gain from more
human capital

ω eHn,j > 0 , the indirect effect from a change in the wage rate  H eωn,j brought about
by a change in the capital-ratio, and possible changes in the rate of return

φ eRn,j+1. Each of these
general-equilibrium components bring about changes in welfare. As for the wage and return effects,
we are unsure, as yet, as to whether they help or hurt. Once the effect on the capital stock is clarified,
these will be pinned down. The point is that if the government’s policy generates net welfare gains then
these can be taxed under the Pareto criterion to bring down the debt.
The path of debt follows
Bn,0 = RB + Gn   Tn,0 for j = 0
Bn,1 = Rn,2Bn,0 + Gn   Tn,1 for j = 1
Bn,j = Rn,jBn,j 1 + Gn   Tn,j for j > 1
Since B = RB + G   T  (from the LFPSS), we have eBn,0  Bn,0   B = Gn   G   (Tn,0   T ) =eG   eTn,0; this means, relative to the LFPSS, an extra spending of eG may be financed by sale of new
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bonds
eBn,0 and new taxes  eTn,0 relative to their levels in LFPSS. What, then, does the path of Pareto-
neutral tax deviations – eq. (25)-(26) – imply for the associated debt-deviation dynamics? The entire
path of public debt deviations may be written as (see Appendix B):
eBn,0 = eG+ ϕ1ekn,1 for j = 0(27) eBn,j = R eBn,j 1 + ϕ1ekn,j+1   ϕ2ekn,j   ϕ3 eHn,j + eG for j > 0(28)
where
(29) ϕ1   φRk > 0; ϕ2   SRk > 0; ϕ3  ω > 0.
First, note that for all j, ϕ1, ϕ2, and ϕ3 are fixed parameters because they are evaluated at their LFPSS
values. Next, note that the different signs for the coefficients of ekn,j+1 and ekn,j refer to the different roles
played by the rate of return and the wage rate. A higher capital-ratio lowers the rate of return, and thus
requires a lower tax; a higher capital-ratio increases the wage requiring the tax to increase.
Turn now to the dynamics of saving. Notice factor returns (ω, R) appearing in (21)-(22), are endoge-
nous, depending both on the level of education offered and taxes. The key issue, then, becomes the
endogenous determination of saving, and thus the capital ratio, via the previously-derived optimality
conditions:
Sn,0 : Ucm(ω
H   RL   Tn,0   Sn,0) = βRn,1Uco(Rn,1Sn,0) for j = 0(30)
Sn,j : Ucm
 
ωn,j h
 
Gn, Hn,j 1
  Tn,j   Sn,j = βRn,j+1Uco(Rn,j+1Sn,j) for j > 0(31)
where
(32) kn,1 =
Kn,1
H
=
Sn,0   Bn,0
H
for j = 0 and kn,j+1 =
Kn,j+1
h
 
Gn, Hn,j 1
 = Sn,j   Bn,j
h
 
Gn, Hn,j 1
 for j > 0.
Taking a first-order Taylor-approximation around the LFPSS, we can show (see Appendix B), for j = 0,´
ekn,1 =  κ1 eBn,0   κ3 eG where(33)
κ1  β (R
)2 Ucoco
{ > 0(34)
κ3 
n
Ucmcm +
h
Ucmcm + β (R
)2 Ucoco
i
khE()
o
{ > 0(35)
{ 
n
Ucmcm + β (R
)2 Ucoco

H + β [Uco + SRUcoco ] Rk
o
< 0(36)
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where { < 0 using Assumption (2). Further down the transition, the path of k-deviations is given by
(37) ekn,j+1 = κ0ekn,j   κ1eBn,j   κ2eBn,j 1   κ3 eG+ κ4 eHn,j
where κ1 and κ3 are defined in (34)-(35) and
κ0   Ucmcm RkS

{ > 0, κ2 
RUcmcm
{ > 0
κ4 
ωUcmcm  
h
Ucmcm + β (R
)2 Ucoco
i
khH ()
{ =
ωSY ()  khH()
H   SR () Rk () Q 0.
Eq. (37) is the equilibrium linearized law of motion involving k and B deviations for all j > 0. The
same for j = 0 is given by (33). Eqs. (27)-(28) is another set of equilibrium linearized laws of motion
involving k and B deviations (the latter subsumes the tax dynamics). They are each derived from the
equal payoff conditions governed by the Pareto criterion. Together, they describe the capital-ratio and
debt deviation dynamics in this economy. We study these in detail further below.
6.2 Impact effects
It follows from (27) and (33) that
(38) ekn,1 = ΓG eG; ΓG    κ3 + κ11+ ϕ1κ1 < 0.
Since ϕ1 > 0, κ1 > 0,and κ3 > 0, it follows ΓG < 0 ) ekn,1 < 0 – the policy, on impact, induces a
decrease in the capital stock in period 1. This sort of crowding-out happens via two channels. First,
ceteris paribus, the higher educational spending increases human capital which reduces the capital
ratio (and hence, wages). Second, the tax payment reduces income, and therefore, saving. The net
result of all this is a higher return on capital, which the initial middle-aged benefit from.23 As a result,
taxes go up on impact: eTn,0 = φ eRn,1 = SR eRn,1 = SRRkΓG eG > 0 : the initial middle-aged, who do not
directly benefit from the higher educational spending, can be taxed under the Pareto criterion.
The question is, is the taxation capacity of the initial middle-aged able to finance the entire extra
education spending, i.e., is eTn,0 = eG possible? That is, is the aforediscussed return-benefit enough to
tax and finance eG and leave the inaugural middle-aged as happy as in the LF? If that were possible,eBn,0 = eG  eTn,0 would imply no change in debt relative to B. This means the problem at hand would
23The general-equilibrium return effect that permits raising taxes to finance the higher educational level is important
because it helps the middle-aged and hence they can be taxed more. The return effect is often used in work that attempts
to generate political support for welfare programs that benefit the old. Poutvaara (2003) and Köthenbürger and Poutvaara
(2006) argue it can be in the interest of the old to finance activities for the young since it may indirectly benefit the old via
changes in asset prices or the tax base. Note an important difference with our analysis though; this line of work, in effect,
uses the return effect to show how, in a political equilibrium, short-term gains (via return effects, say) can help support
policies that are welfare-reducing in the long run. Here, we present the opposite perspective; we ask whether short-term
gains – a higher interest rate – can help usher in policies that come with long-run gains.
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be limited to the one initial generation; there would not arise any intergenerational conflict. This happens
if
(39) χG 
1  ϕ1κ3
1+ ϕ1κ1
< 0.
As our paper is largely focused on intergenerational conflict and the role of debt in amelioration of
the conflict, we proceed by assuming the opposite of (39) , the more anaytically-challenging case where
taxes (under the Pareto criterion) in the initial period alone are insuffficent to pay for eG. This means, the
government runs a deficit in the inaugural period and public debt increases on impact at the first date eTn,0 < eG , eBn,0 > 0 . The presence of intergenerational conflict, therefore, arises under the following
assumption.
Assumption 4 χG  1 ϕ1κ31+ϕ1κ1 > 0.
When does that happen? Consider the impact effect on the public debt in period t. It follows from
(27) and (33) that
(40) eBn,0 = χG eG; χG  1  ϕ1κ31+ ϕ1κ1 ; ϕ1 > 0, κ1 > 0, κ3 > 0
where χG – how the initial debt deviation responds to a marginal change in G – is of ambiguous sign.
If χG > 0 holds, it follows that eBn,0 > 0 or equivalently, eTn,0 < eG.
Consider the taxation capacity of the initial middle-aged. On impact, more education decreases the
capital ratio, which in turn raises the return to capital which benefits the middle-aged once they turn
old raising their taxation capacity. Clearly, the more they can be taxed, the less is the impact effect on
debt. How much they can be taxed depends on three factors: i) the size of the existing human capital
stock which partly determines how much the capital-ratio reacts to a higher G, ii) how strongly the
rate of return responds to a change in the capital ratio, and iii) by how much would agents have to be
compensated (or taxed) for a given change in the rate of return. All of this is captured in the expression
ϕ1κ3. How much the return is affected is measured by κ3 and by how much the taxation capacity is
affected by the return is measured by ϕ1.
For debt to increase on impact, we need χG > 0 , ϕ1κ3 < 1. Focus, for now on ϕ1 where, recall,
ϕ1   φRk =   S

RRk. Immediately, the following is clear: were Rk = 0, as in, say, a small open
economy, then eBn,0 = eG and eTn,0 = 0 meaning debt or taxes would not budge on impact: eG > 0 cannot
be funded. This suggests that the return effect is necessary to generate a rise in taxation capacity – but
not too much – so that debt rises on impact. This requires the return effect to not be too weak or too
strong.
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Using SY and SR as defined in (11) and (9), one can check
ϕ1κ3 < 1() 1+
S
R
Rk
SY
H   SRRk| {z }
>0
+
S
R k

H   SRRk [RkhE()] > 0
where the underscored term is positive via Assumption 3 (stability). Notice the importance of the last
term on the r.h.s in square parentheses: both Rk (as we just saw) and hE() are important. The upshot
is that intergenerational conflict can only arise when debt increases on policy initiation, and for that to
happen, both the return effect and the human capital externality are crucial.
7 Debt dynamics under the Pareto criterion
The underlying j > 0 dynamics of the economy in a neighborhood of the LFPSS is entirely captured by
(33) and (37) and (27)-(28), a two-dimensional, first-order linear dynamical system with a time-evolving
forcing term involving human capital:
eBn,j = R eBn,j 1 + ϕ1ekn,j+1   ϕ2ekn,j   ϕ3 eHn,j + eGekn,j+1 = κ0ekn,j   κ1eBn,j   κ2eBn,j 1   κ3 eG+ κ4 eHn,j 8j > 0
Additionally, there are two initial conditions for j = 0 given by" eBn,0ekn,1
#
=
"
χG eG
ΓG eG
#
; ΓG < 0,χG > 0 (by Assumption 4)
which are pinned down by the model, i.e., not imposed exogenously. In matrix form, the dynamical
system can be time-updated and compactly summarized as
(41)
" eBn,j+1ekn,j+2
#
=
"
A1 A2
B1 B2
# " eBn,jekn,j+1
#
+
"
A3 A4
B3 B4
# " eGeHn,j+1
#
; j  1
where"
A1 A2
B1 B2
#

" R κ2ϕ1
1+ϕ1κ1
 ϕ2+ϕ1κ0
1+ϕ1κ1 Rκ1 κ2
1+ϕ1κ1
ϕ2κ1+κ0
1+ϕ1κ1
#
,
"
A3 A4
B3 B4
#

" 1 ϕ1κ3
1+ϕ1κ1
 ϕ3+ϕ1κ4
1+ϕ1κ1 κ1 κ3
1+ϕ1κ1
ϕ3κ1+κ4
1+ϕ1κ1
#
.
Note, the determinant
det
"
A1 A2
B1 B2
#
=   1
κ1ϕ1 + 1
(κ2ϕ2   κ0R) = 0,
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implying (41) is a system of linearly-dependent equations. The implication is, the dynamics of k fully
mirror the dynamics of B; also, eBn,j+1 does not involve ekn,j+1 and ekn,j+2 does not involve eBn,j. That the
dynamics depends on the education externality is apparent from A4 and B4.
We are now ready to state our main results. To that end, briefly recall what Assumptions 1-4 imply.
Respectively, they guarantee existence of a LF steady state, saving increasing in rate of return, stability
of the LF steady state, and that the debt level rises relative to its LF level upon policy impact.
Proposition 1 Suppose Assumptions 1-4 hold. Consider an incremental increase in public spending on educa-
tion beyond the LFPSS level in period j = 0. Under the Pareto criterion, the inaugural debt deviation (relative to
its value at the LF) is eBn,0 = χG eG > 0. In subsequent periods, the path of debt deviations evolves as
(42) eBn,j+1 = ψB eBn,j + ψG eG+ ψH eHn,j+1 8 j  1.
where ψB,ψG and ψH are determined by LF quantities and involve properties of the utility, production, and
human capital functions. Also,
ψB = R
, ψH < 0
and
ψG < 0
holds if R  1 (dynamic efficiency).
Proof. See Appendix D.
Increasing public educational spending beyond the LF package level raises the tax bill on the initial
middle-aged. They benefit because the interest on their past saving is higher due to the crowding out
of capital. In subsequent periods, the issue is more nuanced. Future cohorts benefit directly from the
higher education levels in terms of higher labor income induced by the externality. This goes in the
direction of increasing the tax that can be levied on those generations (j  1) (ψH < 0) helping to bring
debt levels down. In addition, there may be lagged gains due to the education spending (ψG < 0).
To understand further, note from Appendix D, ψH depends crucially on hH; if hH = 0, then ψH = 0
and for ψH to be negative, it is necessary that hH > 0. Consider what happens at the initial date if
hH = 0. Then (42) implies eBn,1 = ψB eBn,0 + ψG eG, eBn,1   eBn,0 = (ψB   1) eBn,0 + ψG eG , eBn,1   eBn,0 =eG [(ψB   1) χG + ψG]. But (ψB   1) χG + ψG = 0 if hH = 0. This means when the human capital exter-
nality is absent, eBn,1 = eBn,0, and hence, debt levels do not budge. The implication is, absent the exter-
nality, debt levels cannot come down. This explains why even a small externality (hH > 0, ψH < 0)
may be sufficient to start the process of debt reduction as in (42).
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The critical question is whether a debt explosion can be avoided if R  1. It follows from (42) that
(43) eBn,j+2   eBn,j+1 = R heBn,j+1   eBn,ji+ ψH h eHn,j+2   eHn,j+1i , j > 0
Recall, two things: a) eBn,j refers to the deviation of the debt at date j from its value in the LFPSS,
B = L, and b) eBn,0 > 0 implying the initial debt deviation is positive (which holds under Assumption
4). From (43), we see two immediate implications: i) in the absence of the education externality, i.e., if
hH = 0, ψH = 0, it follows if the debt deviation does not shrink rightaway (i.e., between dates 0 and
1) it never will, ii) since human capital deviations are non-decreasing eHn,j+2   eHn,j+1  0 for hH > 0,
then given ψH < 0 holds, the externality works in the direction of reducing future debt deviations
(which are positive), i.e., eBn,j+2  eBn,j+1 < ψB eBn,j+1   eBn,j. Hence, if eBn,j+1   eBn,j < 0, i.e., if there
is a “turning point” in the debt deviation sequence, it is clear that eBn,j+2   eBn,j+1 < 0 holds thereafter.
The implication is that if the debt deviation is decreasing in any period j (j  2), it will keep decreasing
forever after. As we will see below, at some point, the debt deviation (not the debt) will hit zero (i.e.,
the debt level will coincide with B); thereafter, debt levels will fall further. This is also the point where
the tax rate may be brought down (relative to its level determined by the Pareto criterion) allowing
generations to come to experience welfare improvements over the LFPSS level.24
In Proposition 2, we establish conditions under which the debt deviation starts to fall right from the
period after the policy was ushered in, i.e., eBn,1 < eBn,0.which means if ψG < (1  ψB) χG holds, debt
deviations will start to fall immediately, right from the period after the policy was ushered in.
Proposition 2 Public debt starts to fall one period after the initiation date, i.e., eBn,1 < eBn,0, iff
(44) ψG < (1  R) χG
holds. Sufficient conditions for condition (44) to hold are R > 1 and hH > 0.
Proof. See Appendix E.
The implication is that it is possible to implement an education level above the LFPSS level ( eG > 0)
under the Pareto criterion where the first-contributing generation pays a tax ( eG > eTn,0 > 0, eBn,0 > 0),
and all subsequent generations are taxed so that the level of public debt can be brought down starting
from the period after the policy was inaugurated (and forever after). Importantly, no cohorts are worse
off (some are potentially better off) compared to their lifetime utilities under the LFPSS.
In the presence of an intergenerational education externality, possibly a weak one – all that (44)
requires is hH > 0 – enough welfare gains are generated by public education in a dynamically efficient
(R > 1) economy. Needless to say, public debt does not have to fall right away. Proposition 2 simply
notes a sufficient condition for which it does.
24The dynamics of debt beyond such a point are not studied in this paper. The government can, if it so wishes, decide to
stop taxing agents under the Pareto criterion and switch to taxing them under a balanced budget constraint. Alternatively, if
it didn’t, as debt levels fall below B, capital holdings rise, causing R to fall, possibly below 1 – violating dynamic efficiency.
26
Proposition 3 Under Assumptions 1-4 and the conditions specified in Proposition 2, the education policy ( eG
> 0) with associated debt deviation paths eBn,j – eq. (42) – leaves some generations potentially better off and no
generation worse off in utility terms relative to V, the utility under the laissez faire package steady state.
As soon as debt levels have been brought below B, its level under the LFPSS, the government is
raising more revenue than is needed to finance the education level G > L. From this point on, a Pareto
improvement is possible since welfare gains from higher human capital levels linger and taxes can be
reduced below the level dictated by the Pareto-criterion. It follows that all generations born after such
a time may be better off than in the LF. 25
8 Numerics
The analysis above has several limitations that have to do with concerns of analytical tractability. First,
labor supply was exogenously specified; second, the perturbation of public education, eG, was incre-
mental; and finally, the tax rate was lump-sum. It was also the case that the starting point of the policy
was the LFPSS. Below, we sketch out the equations that would determine equilibrium paths under en-
dogenous labor supply, Q, non-incremental change in G and a distorting tax rate on labor income. We
then analyze this expanded economy using numerical techniques.
Assume all is same as before except agents now have a labor-leisure choice when middle-aged and
are retired when old. Using otherwise the same notation as before, one can write lifetime utility in the
LF for the cohort young in t+ j  1 as
(45)
Ω(τt+j,ωt+j, Rt+j, Rt+j+1) = U
 
1  τt+j

ωt+j h
 
Et+j 1, Ht+j 1

Qt+j   Rt+jLt+j 1   St+j, Qt+j

+ βU(Rt+j+1St+j)
where
cm,t+j =

1  τt+j

ωt+j h
 
Et+j 1, Ht+j 1

Qt+j   Rt+jLt+j 1   St+j(46)
co,t+j+1 = Rt+j+1St+j(47)
Given a pre-determined education decision
 
Lt+j 1

from young age, the middle-aged choose labor
supply and saving by maximizing (45) subject to (46)-(47). The first order conditions are:
St+j :  Ucm
 
cm,t+j, Qt+j

+ βRt+j+1Uco
 
co,t+j+1

= 0(48)
Qt+j : Ucm
 
cm,t+j, Qt+j
 
1  τt+j

ωt+jh
 
Et+j 1, Ht+j 1

+UQt+j
 
cm,t+j, Qt+j

= 0(49)
25It is not necessary that only generations born after the debt is eliminated be made better off. It may be possible to release
some of these gains to earlier generations, thereby making every generation post policy strictly better off. We allow for this
in the numerical example in Section 8.
27
The latter is a one-period decision. Notice optimal labor supply depends on the human capital invest-
ment made as young. The other one-period decision, educational decision as young is
max
Lt+j 1
U
 
1  τt+j

ωt+j h
 
Et+j 1, Ht+j 1

Qt+j   Rt+jLt+j 1   St+j, Lt+j

+ βU(Rt+j+1St+j),
given (48) and (49), is described by

1  τt+j

ωt+j hE
 
Et+j 1, Ht+j 1

Qt+j   Rt+j = 0 if Qt+j 1 > 0.
In implicit form, these optimality conditions may be summarized as
Qt+j 1 = N(τt+j,ωt+j, Rt+j, Rt+j+1)
Lt+j = L(τt+j,ωt+j, Rt+j, Rt+j+1)
St+j = S(τt+j,ωt+j, Rt+j, Rt+j+1)
The capital to effective labor ratio evolves according as
kt+j+1 
Kt+j+1
Ht+j+1Qt+j
=
St+j  

Bt+j + Lt+j

Ht+j+1Qt+j
,
and the public debt is governed by
Bn+j + τn+jωn+jh
 
Ln+j 1, Hn+j 1

Qn+j = Rn+jBnt+j 1 + Gn+j.
The idea is to introduce a G quite a bit bigger than the L chosen in the LF steady state (such that private
agents set L to 0). Post intervention, we restrict utility for all current and future cohorts to be better than
utility under the LF by a factor (1+ κ) , κ > 0. That is, we pick the tax rate sequence, τn+j, to satisfy the
following condition:
Ωn+j() = (1+ κ)ΩLFt+j()
If we find such a sequence and the associated path of Bn+j shows a turning point, then we will have
found an example of a policy package that delivers strictly higher utility to all current and future co-
horts.
8.1 Parameter choices
Ours is not a full-blown calibration exercise since the three-period overlapping-generations model we
study is ill-suited for serious calibration. Nevertheless, we attempt to set up the parameters so that
the baseline/LF model roughly captures some features of a economy like the U.S. If a period in the
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model is roughly 20 years of calendar time, then, assuming an annual (after-tax) gross interest rate
of 1.03, our LF steady state generates R  1.8 which is roughly the same as (1.03)20. The capital-to-
output ratio in the data is roughly 3; our LF steady state has it at 0.15. Since K is a stock and Y a flow,
an appropriate measure of the capital-to-output ratio in the model is ..... In the LF, there is no public
education. Estimates of private education spending to GDP for the U.S. are just under 2%; our LF
steady state has it at ..... Estimates of public education spending to GDP for the U.S. are near 5%; our
LF steady state has it at .....
We assume the production function to be Cobb-Douglas,
Yt+j = AK1 αt+j
 
Qt+jHt+j
α
and assume preferences of the CES form:
Ωt+j(cm,t+j, Qt+j, co,t+j+1) = χc

cm,t+j
1 σ   1
1  σ +
1
1  γχl

1 Qt+j
1 γ
+
1
1+ δ
χo

co,t+j+1
1 σ   1
1  σ .
The human capital function is given by
Ht+j = χh
 
F+ Et+j 1
e Hηt+j 1.
The baseline parameters are:
A = 2.5; α =
2
3
; F = 0.001; e = 0.63; η = 0.3
γ = 10; σ = 2; δ = 2
χc = 1; χl = 1; χo = 1; χh = 2
Our choice of δ implies a 30-year discount factor of 1/2. Here α is the labor-share of output which
roughly matches with 66% in U.S. data. σ = 2 is commonly used. The following scale parameters are
shut down: χc = 1; χl = 1; χo = 1. e, η and F conform to parameter choices made in de la Croix and
Doepke (1993) and Cavalcanti and Giannitsarou (2017); indeed our choice of F is lower than theirs so
as to not bias the results in our favor. A is a scale parameter that was chosen to deliver R  1. 6. The
value of γ was chosen to...
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8.2 Results
Figure 1: Debt-to-GDP ratio across time
In base case, the value of G is set at 2.5 times the level of education at the LF steady state. Clearly, this
is not an incremental change from the LF. In the top panel of Figure 1, we also report on G-high (2.75
times) and G-low (2.25 times) the level of education at the LF steady state. In the LF steady state, debt is
zero, R  1.9. On impact, debt rises to about 1.8% of GDP; thereafter, it starts to fall, and is eliminated
by seven periods. For G-high (G-low), the time to debt elimination is longer (shorter), that is, more
ambitious packages require more debt at the inaugural stage and take longer to pay off. All along,
though, no generation is hurt relative to the LF steady state – indeed, by construction every generation
post policy is κ = ... times better off.
How does the strength of the human capital externality influence the results? In the bottom panel
of Figure 1, we report on three values of the externality, η = 0.3 (base), η = 0.295 (low) and η = 0.305
(high). In each case, the value of G is set at 2.5 times the level of education at the LF steady state, the
same as in the baseline case above. The case with a strong externality requires a shorter time for debt
to disappear.
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Figure 2: Policy reform away from the LF steady state
Finally, in Figure 2, we report on a policy reform that starts at a date well before the economy has
reached the LF steady state. Before the policy is introduced, agents receive the same utility as one
would along the LF transition. However, by construction, starting from the inaugural date of the policy,
all agents receive the same utility as they would have in the LF steady state, a much higher level of
utility than they were used to before the reform. As Figure 2 illustrates, not much additional insight
is generated except that trying to generate long-run utility levels in the short-run is ambitious, and as
such, debt lingers on a bit longer.
9 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we study a government policy that internalizes an intergenerational human capital ex-
ternality and attempts to introduce public education spending at levels above laissez faire. The gov-
ernment uses a mix of public debt and lump-sum taxes on the working generation (those who stand
to gain directly from the government’s program) to help finance its education policy. Public educa-
tion generates long-run income gains by increasing the stock of accumulated human capital via the
education externality. Other general-equilibrium welfare gains arise from the crowding out of capital
by debt. These produce additional changes to income at various points in the lifecycle via changes in
factor prices. These gains are taxable and may be used to bring down the debt. Whether (and how)
this is possible is technically challenging given the various, confounding general-equilibrium effects.
Most strikingly, we are able to establish that it is possible to implement the government’s policy under
a generational Pareto criterion, meaning no generation in the transition is hurt relative to the no-policy
world. This holds in a dynamically efficient economy under the sufficient condition that there is a
human capital externality even when private and public education are perfect substitutes.
It bears mention here that while the entire analysis was conducted using debt and lump-sum taxes
on the middle-aged, it is quite possible that other instrument combinations (such as pensions – Boldrin
and Montes (2005) and Andersen and Bhattacharya, 2017) could have been used to overcome the im-
plementation problem that lies at the heart of this paper although the technical challenge of working
with a closed economy would nevertheless remain.
The bigger message is that intergenerational conflict – short-run costs become a barrier to the intro-
duction of policies which have long-term gains – may be overcome without hurting any transitional
generation and debt finance can make it so. The techniques used in this paper may therefore be used
to study the implementation of a whole host of policies – health, infrastructure, environment, gains
from trade, and so on – that routinely create the scope for intergenerational conflict. Parenthetically,
our analysis offers an improved Kaldor-Hicks criterion, one that no longer verifies a hypothetical net
PDV but works with the actual PDV of costs versus benefits (including all general equilibrium effects)
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that a policy would bring about. This widens the scope of use of the Kaldor-Hicks criterion which has
suffered from limited applicability because of the hypothetical nature of the compensations it studied.
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Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 2
Consider the stability properties of the LFPSS equilibrium. Since E = L = G, we have H (G) = H.
The first order condition determining saving reads
Ucm (ω (kt)H
   R(kt)G  St)  βR (kt+1)Uco (R(kt+1)St) = 0.
Recalling St = Kt+1 + Bt and bt  BtHt , this can be rewritten as
Ucm (ω (kt)H
   R (kt)G  H (kt+1 + bt))  βR (kt+1)Uco (R(kt+1)H [kt+1 + bt]) = 0.
Taking a first-order linearization around the LFPSS equilibrium, and defining b  BH we have
Ucmcm ()
h
ωk ()Hekt   Rk ()Gekt   Hekt+1i  βRk ()Uco ()ekt+1
 βRUcoco () [RH + RkH [k + b])]ekt+1 = 0
or
Ucmcm () [ωk ()H   Rk ()G]ekt = [HUcmcm () + βRk ()Uco () + βRUcoco () [RH + RkH [k + b]]]ekt+1
and further as
ekt+1 = Ucmcm () [ωk ()H   Rk ()G]HUcmcm () + βRk ()Uco () + βRUcoco () [RH + Rk ()H [k + b]]ekt
or
ekt+1 = Ucmcm () [ωk ()H   RkG]
H
h
Ucmcm () + β [R]2 Ucoco ()
i
+ βRk () [Uco () + RUcoco ()H [k + b]]
ekt.
Routine steps follow:
ekt+1 = Ucmcm ()Ucmcm ()+β[R]2Ucoco () [ωk ()H   Rk ()G]
H + βRk () Uco ()+R
Ucoco ()H[k+b]
Ucmcm ()+β[R]2Ucoco ()
ekt = SY () [ωk ()H   Rk ()G]H   Rk () SR () ekt
=
SY () [ kRk ()H   Rk ()G]
H   Rk () SR ()
ekt =  SY () [kH + G] Rk ()H   Rk () SR () ekt
=  SY () [K
 + G] Rk ()
H   Rk () SR ()
ekt
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where SR  ∂S∂R and SY  ∂S∂Y . This yields
ekt+1 =   SY () SRk ()H   Rk () SR ()ekt
where S = K + G and kH = K. Note   SY()SRk()H Rk()SR() > 0. For stability, we require  
SY()SRk()
H Rk()SR() <
1 which can be rewritten as Rk () [SR ()  SY () S] 1H < 1.
B Linearized model
To analyze the dynamics, the model is linearized around the LF steady state. We exploit the equivalence
in eq. (20) – in Lemma 1 – which equates the utility level in the LF with that achieved under the LF
package.
Life time utility for cohort j can, by a first-order Taylor-approximation, be written
V (ωH   RL   Tn,0, Rn,1) ' V  VY() eTn,0 +VR()eRn,1
implying
eTn,0 = φ eRn,1 where φ = VR()VY()
For subsequent periods, the “equal pay-off condition” reads
V
 
ωn,jHn,j
 
Gn, Hn,j 1
  Tn,j, Rn,j+1 = V.
Taking a first-order Taylor approximation around the LFPSS, we get
V
 
ωn,jHn,j
 
Gn, Hn,j 1
  Tn,j, Rn,j+1 = V +VY() hH eωn,j +ω eHn,j   eTn,ji+VR()eRn,j+1
It follows
(50) eTn,j = H eωn,j +ω eHn,j + φ eRn,j+1 ? 0 for j > 0.
Using eTn,0 = φ eRn,1 and noting that for a small perturbation from the steady state, eRn,1 = Rkekn,1, we
have eBn,0 = eG  φ eRn,1 ) eBn,0 = eG  φRkekn,1 ) eBn,0 = eG+ ϕ1ekn,1 where ϕ1   φRk =   SRRk > 0.
Future debt evolves according to
Bn,j = Rn,jBn,j 1 + Gn   Tn,j.
A Taylor approximation yields
eBn,j = R eBn,j 1 + eRn,jBn,j 1 + eG  bTn,j
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where bTn,j is given in (50). In more compact form, the debt equations can be written
eBn,0 = eG+ ϕ1ekn,1 for j = 0eBn,j = eRn,jBn,j 1 + R eBn,j 1   H eωn,j  ω eHn,j   φ eRn,j+1 + eG for j > 0
Saving in period 0, and thus the period 1 capital stock, is determined from eq. (30). Taking a first-
order Taylor-approximation around the LF equilibrium, we get
Ucmcm ()
h
 eSn,0   eTn,0i = βeRn,1Uco () + βRUcoco () heRn,1S + ReSn,0i
,
h
Ucmcm () + β [R]2 Ucoco ()
i eSn,o =  βeRn,1Uco ()  βRUcoco () S eRn,1  Ucmcm () eTn,0.
Using (32), we have kn,1 =
K1
H1
=) ekn,1 = eKn,1H   KH2 hE() eG, since eHn,1 = hE() eG. Using eKn,1 = eSn,0
 eBn,0, we have eSn,0 = Hekn,1 + khE() eG + eBn,0 and using eBn,0 = eG   eTn,0, we can rewrite the above
equation ash
Ucmcm () + β [R]2 Ucoco ()
i h
Hekn,1 + khE() eG+ eBn,0i =  βeRn,1Uco ()  βRUcoco () S eRn,1
 Ucmcm ()
h eG  eBn,0i .
Some routine manipulation yields (33)
ekn,1 =  β [R]2 Ucoco () eBn,0  
n
Ucmcm () +
h
Ucmcm () + β [R]2 Ucoco ()
i
khE()
o eGh
Ucmcm () + β [R]2 Ucoco ()
i
H + βRk [Uco () + RSUcoco ()]
which may, further, be compactly written as
ekn,1 =  κ1 eBn,0   κ3 eG .
For all periods j > 0 : From (31), a similar first-order Taylor approximation of
Sn,j : Ucm
 
ωn,j h
 
Gn, Hn,j 1
  Tn,j   Sn,j = βRn,j+1Uco(Rn,j+1Sn,j) for j > 0
yields
Ucmcm ()
heωn,jH +ω eHn,j   eTn,j   eSn,ji = βeRn,j+1Uco () + βRUcoco () heRn,j+1S + ReSn,ji
()
h
Ucmcm () + β [R]2 Ucoco ()
i eSn,j = Ucmcm () heωn,jH +ω eHn,j   eTn,ji  βeRn,j+1 [Uco () + SRUcoco ()]
or using eBn,j = eRn,jB + R eBn,j 1 + eG  eTn,j, and B = G, we can restate the savings equation in terms
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of public debt as followsh
Ucmcm + R
2Ucoco
i eSn,j = Ucmcm heωn,jH +ω eHn,j + eBn,j   eRn,jG  R eBn,j 1   eGi  [Uco + SRUcoco ] eRn,j+1
Usingekn,j+1 = eKn,j+1H   KH2 eHn,j+1 , Hekn,j+1+ k hhE() eG+ hH() eHn,ji = eKn,j+1 and eHn,j+1 = hE() eG+
hH() eHn,j and eKn,j+1 = eSn,j   eBn,j,we have
eSn,j = Hekn,j+1 + khE() eG+ khH() eHn,j + eBn,j
and soh
Ucmcm + R
2Ucoco
i h
Hekn,j+1 + khE() eG+ khH() eHn,j + eBn,ji
= Ucmcm
heωn,jH +ω eHn,j + eBn,j   eRn,jG  R eBn,j 1   eGi  [Uco + SRUcoco ] eRn,j+1h
Ucmcm + R
2Ucoco
i
Hekn,j+1 + hUcmcm + R2Ucocoi hkhE() eG+ khH() eHn,j + eBn,ji
= Ucmcm
heωn,jH +ω eHn,j + eBn,j   eRn,jG  R eBn,j 1   eGi  Rk [Uco + SRUcoco ]ekn,j+1hh
Ucmcm + R
2Ucoco
i
H + Rk [Uco + SRUcoco ]
iekn,j+1
= Ucmcm
heωn,jH +ω eHn,j + eBn,j   Rkekn,jG  R eBn,j 1   eGi  hUcmcm + R2Ucocoi hkhE() eG+ khH() eHn,j + eBn,ji
or,
{ekn,j+1 = Ucmcm heωn,jH +ω eHn,j + eBn,j   R eBn,j 1   eGi Ucmcm + R2Ucoco hkhE() eG+ khH() eHn,j + eBn,ji Ucmcm Rkekn,jG
where {   Ucmcm + R2UcocoH + [Uco + SRUcoco ] Rk	 < 0. Collecting terms etc., we get
{ekn,j+1 =  Ucmcm Rkekn,j [K+ G] + hUcmcmω  Ucmcm + R2Ucoco khH()i eHn,j   R2Ucoco eBn,j
 Ucmcm R eBn,j 1   hUcmcm + Ucmcm + R2Ucoco khE()i eG
or
{ekn,j+1 =  Ucmcm () [G+ K] Rkek j + β hRi2 Ucoco () eBn,j   RUcmcm () eBn,j 1
 

Ucmcm () +

Ucmcm () + β
h
R
i2
Ucoco ()

khE()
 eG+ ωUcmcm () Ucmcm () + β hRi2 Ucoco () khH() eHj
implying (37).
ekn,j+1 = κ0ekn,j   κ1eBn,j   κ2eBn,j 1   κ3 eG+ κ4 eHn,j
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In sum, for period j = 0, we have
eBn,0 = eG+ ϕ1ekn,1ekn,1 =  κ1eBn,0   κ3 eG
implying
eBn,0 = 1  ϕ1κ31+ ϕ1κ1 eG = χG eG; χG  1  ϕ1κ31+ ϕ1κ1ekn,1 =   κ3 + κ11+ ϕ1κ1 = ΓG eG; ΓG    κ3 + κ11+ ϕ1κ1 < 0
The underlying dynamics of the economy for j > 0 is given by
eBn,j = R eBn,j 1 + ϕ1ekn,j+1   ϕ2ekn,j   ϕ3 eHn,j + eGekn,j+1 = κ0ekn,j   κ1eBn,j   κ2eBn,j 1   κ3 eG+ κ4 eHn,j 8j > 0
or, rearranging,
eBn,j   ϕ1ekn,j+1 = R eBn,j 1   ϕ2ekn,j   ϕ3 eHn,j + eG
κ1eBn,j +ekn,j+1 =  κ2eBn,j 1 + κ0ekn,j   κ3 eG+ κ4 eHn,j
a two-dimensional first-order linear dynamical system. In matrix form, this system can be compactly
written as"
1  ϕ1
κ1 1
# " eBn,jekn,j+1
#
=
"
R  ϕ2
 κ2 κ0
# " eBn,j 1ekn,j
#
+
"
1  ϕ3
 κ3 κ4
# " eGeHn,j
#
,
or " eBn,jekn,j+1
#
=
"
1  ϕ1
κ1 1
# 1 "
R  ϕ2
 κ2 κ0
# " eBn,j 1ekn,j
#
+
"
1  ϕ1
κ1 1
# 1 "
1  ϕ3
 κ3 κ4
# " eGeHn,j
#
which can be evaluated as" eBn,jekn,j+1
#
=
"
A1 A2
B1 B2
# " eBn,j 1ekn,j
#
+
"
A3 A4
B3 B4
# " eGeHn,j
#
the same as (41) once time updated.
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C Proof of Lemma 3
Lemma 3
det
"
A1 A2
B1 B2
#
=   1
κ1ϕ1 + 1
(κ2ϕ2   κ0R) = 0,
Proof.
A1B2 = B1A2 , R
   κ2ϕ1
1+ ϕ1κ1
ϕ2κ1 + κ0
1+ ϕ1κ1
 
 ϕ2 + ϕ1κ0
1+ ϕ1κ1
 Rκ1   κ2
1+ ϕ1κ1

= 0
, R
κ0   κ2ϕ2
κ1ϕ1 + 1
= 0
which holds since
Rκ0 =
 RUcmcm () Rk () (G+ K)
{ , and κ2ϕ2 =
 RUcmcm () SRk ()
{ with S
 = G+ K.
This proves the determinant is zero.
D Proof of Proposition 1
We start by back timing and rewriting (41) as
eBn,j = A1eBn,j 1 + A2ekn,j + A3 eG+ A4 eHn,j(51) ekn,j+1 = B1eBn,j 1 + B2ekn,j + B3 eG+ B4 eHn,j(52)
Using (52), solve for eBn,j 1 to get eBn,j 1 = 1B1ekn,j+1   1B1 B2ekn,j   1B1 B3 eG  1B1 B4 eHn,j, and then substitute
it back into (51) to get
eBj = A1B1 ekn,j+1 +

A2   A1B1 B2

| {z }
=0
ekn,j + A4   A1B1 B4
 eHn,j + A3   A1B1 B3
 eG
or
eBn,j = A1B1 ekn,j+1 +

A4   A1B1 B4
 eHn,j + A3   A1B1 B3
 eG
Define pi1  A1B1 , pi0  [A3   pi1B3] and pi2  A4   pi1B4. Then,
(53) eBn,j = pio eG+ pi1ekn,j+1 + pi2 eHn,j
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Similarly, one can write
ekn,j+1 = B1 1A1 eBn,j +

B2   B1 A2A1

| {z }
=0
ekn,j   B1 1A1
h
A3 eG+ A4 eHn,ji+ B3 eG+ B4 eHn,j
or simplifying,
ekn,j+1 = B1A1 eBn,j +

B4   B1A1 A4
 eHn,j +B3   B1A1 A3
 eG
Using (53) and bringing back a period, we get ekn,j = 1pi1 heBn,j 1   pi0 eG  pi2 eHn,j 1i. Hence it follows
from (51) that
eBn,j = A1eBn,j 1 + A2pi1
heBn,j 1   pi0 eG  pi2 eHn,j 1i+ A3 eG+ A4 eHn,j
=

A1 +
A2
pi1
 eBn,j 1 + A3   A2pi1 pi0
 eG+ A4 eHn,j   A2pi1 pi2 eHn,j 1
which, using eHn,j = hE () eG+ hH () eHn,j 1 yields,
eBj = A1 + A2pi1
 eBn,j 1 + A3   A2pi1 pi0
 eG+ A4 hhE () eG+ hH () eHn,j 1i  A2pi1 pi2 eHn,j 1
or,
eBn,j = A1 + A2pi1
 eBn,j 1 + A3   A2pi1 pi0 + A4hE ()
 eG+ A4hH ()  pi2 A2
pi1
 eHn,j 1
or
(54) eBn,j = ψB eBn,j 1 + ψG eG+ ψH eHn,j 1,
where
ψB  A1 +
A2
pi1
= A1 + B2,
ψG  A3  
pi0
pi1
A2 + hE () A4,
ψH = hH () A4  
A2
pi1
pi2.
We now prove ψB  A1+ B2 = R > 1. To see this, use the coefficient definitions to see that A1+ B2
can be written as
A1 + B2 =
R   κ2ϕ1
1+ ϕ1κ1
+
ϕ2κ1 + κ0
1+ ϕ1κ1
.
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Since κ0 = ϕ1κ2 (Note that κ0 = ϕ1κ2 since K = S  G) and since Rκ0 = ϕ2κ2, it follows that Rϕ1κ2 =
ϕ2κ2 or R
ϕ1 = ϕ2 we have
ψB  A1 + B2 =
R   κ2ϕ1
1+ ϕ1κ1
+
ϕ2κ1 + κ0
1+ ϕ1κ1
=
R + ϕ2κ1
1+ ϕ1κ1
=
R [1+ ϕ1κ1]
1+ ϕ1κ1
= R > 1
Next, we establish the sign of ψG. Using pi0 = A3   pi1B3, ψG reduces to
ψG = A3   A3B2 + B3A2 + hE () A4 = [1  κ3ϕ1 + κ3ϕ2   κ0 + hE () [ ϕ3 + ϕ1κ4]]
1
1+ ϕ1κ1
.
Then, ψG < 0 if
1  κ3ϕ1 + κ3ϕ2   κ0 + hE () [ ϕ3 + ϕ1κ4] < 0.
Using ϕ3hE () = R, and Rϕ1 = ϕ2, routine algebra verifies
ψG < 0) 1  κ3ϕ1 + κ3ϕ2   κ0 + hE () [ ϕ3 + ϕ1κ4] = [1  R] [1  κ3ϕ1]  φa < 0
where (using ωhE () = R),
(55) φa   
1
{
S
R
Rk ()
h
Ucmcm () + β [R]2 Ucoco ()
i
khH () hE () > 0 given hH () > 0
For R > 1 and since κ3ϕ1   1 < 0 (by Assumption 4), ψG < 0 holds.
Finally, consider ψH < 0. Routine algebra verifies
ψH = hH () A4   B2A4 + A2B4
= hH ()  ϕ3 + ϕ1κ41+ ϕ1κ1
  ϕ2κ1 + κ0
1+ ϕ1κ1
 ϕ3 + ϕ1κ4
1+ ϕ1κ1

+
 ϕ2 + ϕ1κ0
1+ ϕ1κ1

ϕ3κ1 + κ4
1+ ϕ1κ1
= hH ()
 ϕ3 + ϕ1κ4
1+ ϕ1κ1

+
ϕ3κ0   κ4ϕ2
1+ ϕ1κ1
,
and hence
sign ψH = sign Θ
where
Θ  hH () [ ϕ3 + ϕ1κ4] + ϕ3κ0   κ4ϕ2
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Inserting ϕ and κ expressions, we get
Θ = hH ()

 ω   φRkω
SY ()  khH()
H   SR () Rk ()

 ω SY () S
Rk
H   SR () Rk () +
ωSY ()  khH()
H   SR () Rk () S
Rk
= hH ()

 ω   φRkω
SY ()  khH()
H   SR () Rk ()

  k
hH()
H   SR () Rk ()S
Rk
Assumption 4 implies that 1  ϕ1κ3 > 0 or
R + SRk
SY
H   SRRk +
Sk
H   SRRk [RkhE()] > 0
We have that
Θ = hH ()

 ω   φRkω
SY ()  khH()
H   SR () Rk ()  
1
hE()
khE()
H   SR () Rk ()S
Rk

= hH ()

S
R
Rk
khH()
H   SR () Rk ()  
1
hE()

R + SRk
SY
H   SRRk +
khE()
H   SR () Rk ()S
Rk

< 0
and hence under Assumption 4, ψH < 0 holds for hH () > 0.
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E Proof of Proposition 2
From (54), we have eBn,j = ψB eBn,j 1 + ψG eG+ ψH eHn,j 1 for j  1. For j = 1,
eBn,1 = ψB eBn,0 + ψG eG+ ψH eHn,0
we know
eBn,0 = 1  ϕ1κ31+ ϕ1κ1 eG = χG eG; eHn,0 = 0
then,
eBn,1 = ψB eBn,0 + ψG eG < eBn,0
(ψB   1) eBn,0 + ψG eG < 0
(ψB   1)
1  ϕ1κ3
1+ ϕ1κ1
eG+ ψG eG < 0
question is, does ψG < χG (1  ψB)   ψHhE() hold? For this, it is sufficient that ψG < χG (1  ψB)
holds since ψHhE() < 0. Using
ψG =
1
1+ ϕ1κ1
[1  κ3ϕ1 + κ3ϕ2   κ0 + hE () [ ϕ3 + ϕ1κ4]] ; ψB = R; χG =
1  ϕ1κ3
1+ ϕ1κ1
the condition ψG < χG (1  ψB) can be written as
(56)
1
1+ ϕ1κ1
[1  κ3ϕ1 + κ3ϕ2   κ0 + hE () [ ϕ3 + ϕ1κ4]] < [1  R]
1  ϕ1κ3
1+ ϕ1κ1
Since κ0 = ϕ1κ2 (Note that κ0 = ϕ1κ2 since K = S  G) and since Rκ0 = ϕ2κ2, it follows that Rϕ1κ2 =
ϕ2κ2 or R
ϕ1 = ϕ2. Routine algebra verifies (56) reduces to
1  κ0 + hE () [ ϕ3 + ϕ1κ4] < [1  R]
and using ϕ3hE () = R and ϕ1κ4hE () = κ0   φa it reduces further to
1  κ0   R + κ0   φa < 1  R , 1  R   φa < 1  R ,  φa < 0
It follows from (55) the above inequality is fulfilled for hH () > 0. Note that φa = 0 for hH() = 0
implying a knife-edge case where eBn,j+1 = eBn,j.
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